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The role of the state in the Great Divergence 
Introduction 
 
I would have loved to have written The Great Divergence. It changed the way 
people look at a central problem in historiography and that is the best a 
historian can hope for. However, I think that there are problems in the 
approach of Pomeranz and more in general the so-called California School1 
in dealing with that divergence. Studying it actually means dealing with four 
different questions. The first one concerns the very first take-off: What 
caused the first escape in history from the Malthusian constraints? The 
second question concerns how the growth that then emerged could become 
self-sustaining. The third question concerns how some countries caught up. 
If all countries would have done so, there wouldn’t be a Great Divergence. 
So there is a fourth question: Why did so many countries not catch up? 
Today I will only talk about the first question and the way Californians deal 





The main thesis of the California School is that the Great Divergence took 
place rather late in history, during the late eighteenth and the beginning of 
the nineteenth centuries, and that it was contingent. Its adherents clearly 
oppose the idea of European exceptionalism according to which ‘Europe’ 
would have been on a different trajectory from the rest of the world from 
quite early onwards, at least since the end of the Middle Ages, and was 
bound to be the place where the Industrial Revolution would occur.  
Californians fundamentally disagree with that. They claim that even 
at the beginning of the eighteenth century it was not clear that (Western) 
Europe was heading for an unprecedented economic breakthrough. There 
                                                     
1 The best-known amongst these scholars are Kenneth Pomeranz, Roy Bin Wong, 
Jack Goldstone, James Lee, Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, Robert Marks, 
Peter Perdue, and the late Andre Gunder Frank. They are often called ‘the 
California School’ because many of them worked at universities in California. The 





was nothing inevitable about its industrial future. The first industrial 
revolution was primarily a matter of a certain historical ‘conjuncture’. 
According to them, on its eve, economic conditions and potential in several 
advanced parts of the world e.g., (parts of) China, Japan and Britain, still 
were quite similar, or to put it in Pomeranz’s famous quote the still were “a 
world of surprising resemblances”. In their view, as yet, no significant, 
structural differences or gaps existed between the economies of those 
regions. That of course is quite a contentious claim. The most fascinating 
thing about this entire conference as such probably is that intelligent people 
apparently have begun to wonder why China was not the first industrial 
nation instead of Britain. Some thirty years ago, not many people would 
have bothered or rather; many people would have considered the question 
weird. Something must have changed in the way people look at China’s past. 





When Pomeranz claims that there were no fundamental differences 
between e.g. eighteenth-century China, Britain and Japan, he means that 
they were all Malthusian societies. None of them had solved the basic 
problem that Malthus pointed at, which is that in all the societies he knew 
the four basic requirements in every economy (food, shelter, clothing and 
energy) had all to be catered for (almost) entirely via land. That implies that 
all pre-industrial societies faced the problem that a sustained increase of 
population in the long run could not be combined with a sustained increase 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. One can only agree: all pre-
industrial societies indeed were Malthusian and in that respect quite similar. 
Even though all this may sound quite obvious and to some even 
uninteresting, it actually is fundamental. It is good to be reminded of it. 
Industrial societies no longer are Malthusian. If the main problem of 
pre-industrial societies in creating the sustained and substantial economic 
growth that characterises industrial societies was the scarcity of land, 
industrial societies apparently have solved that problem. Britain was the first 
country that managed to do so. According to Pomeranz, the British 
happened to have a lot of coal and a lot of colonies which enabled them to 
break through the Malthusian ceiling. That is the essence and - in 
Pomeranz’s view - the explanation of their Industrial Revolution. Obviously 




Britain therefore figures prominently in studies by Californians. They claim 
that of the regions outside Western Europe, China would have had the 
most advanced economy. The Chinese, however, did not have enough coal 
- or it was in the wrong place with all the problems that implied - and they 
did not have colonies. So they could not escape from Malthus and have 
modern economic growth. Of course Pomeranz admits there existed 
difference between various part of Eurasia but according to him they clearly 
did not matter so much to make it obvious that the Great Transformation 
would occur in Western Europe. What he focuses upon and emphasizes are 
surprising similarities in agricultural, commercial and proto-industrial 
development among various parts of Eurasia as late as 1750.  
 
 
What about the differences? 
 
What I want to concentrate upon today are major differences between Britain 
and China at the time. I will focus on the very long eighteenth century, the 
period roughly from the 1680s to the 1850s, and try to point at several 
differences that are so fundamental and big that they simply must have made 
a difference for the economic development and potential of both countries. 
The California school has had an enormous impact on the debate on ‘the 
rise of the West’. That impact is well deserved. Some of its claims, however, 
have to be rejected and its approach definitely has to be broadened. In this 
lecture I only have a limited amount of time and I am not addressing an 
audience of selected specialists. That means my comments will all be quite 
general, introductory and ‘schematic’ in the sense of systematically 
juxtaposing China and Britain as if this actually would be uniform entities. I 
definitely have no urge or claim to present anything ‘definite’ or ‘complete’. 
For further and more detailed information, I refer to my more extended 





To test the ‘surprising resemblances-thesis’, we must begin by looking at 
agriculture, the main source of income and employment in any pre-
industrial society. Doing so, one can only be struck by differences, not 
                                                     





resemblances. Looking, for example, at the sizes of farms in the second half 
the eighteenth century, one can only conclude that these were quite 
different. In the Southern part of Britain, farms on average were one 
hundred and fifty acres. In the North, that was one hundred acres. In the 
densely populated parts of China Proper, overall, that average was a mere 
five acre. I would not call that a ‘surprising resemblance’ and I am sure that 
the average peasant at the time would agree.  
The second thing one might do when looking at agriculture is to 
determine what peasants did with their land. Did they, for example, use it 
for growing crops or for keeping animals? Again, we see a huge difference 
here: Sixty per cent of the land in Britain at that same moment in time was 
used to feed animals. In China that was three to five percent. That is not 
what I would call a ‘surprising resemblance’ either. In Western Europe, 
overall, around 1800, more land was used to feed the many millions of 
animals used in agriculture than to feed people. Those animals ate a lot: An 
average horse, in terms of weight, could eat as much as eight adults.  
A third big difference one comes across when comparing Britain’s 
agriculture to that in China, is that in Britain up to fifty - Some would even 
claim seventy-five - percent of the people in the countryside were wage-
labourers. In China, that was less than five percent. They often were 
referred to as ‘bare sticks’, which means that they normally did not marry 
and get children. Again, this is an enormous difference.  
In brief, agriculture in Britain was large-scale; animals played an 
absolutely fundamental role in it and on the many large farms wage-labour 
was normal and wide-spread. An old-fashioned Marxist would say that 
Britain in its agriculture had an altogether different mode of production 
from what we see in China. Californians are not keen on thinking in terms 
of such modes of production. The concept, which was at the heart of 
Marxist analysis for so long, in any case hardly ever appears in their 
publications. A dogmatic interpretation of the concept, and in particular the 
idea that there exists a specific succession of such modes of production, 
indeed has to be rejected. But as an analytical concept it definitely has its 
value.  
If we systematically compare the prevalent mode of production in 
British agriculture to that of China, it is clear that differences are quite 
substantial. For China’s agriculture a household-mode of production was 
typical. Small farms run by peasant-households predominated. Not just in 
rice farming, where there may have existed an economic rationale for 




dividing all land in small plots, but also in the growing - and processing - of 
tea, which outside China soon came to be associated with large plantations. 
The size of tea farms in China was one to five acres. As compared to most 
tea farms that would come into existence elsewhere in the world, they were 
mere gardens. Cotton growing too, as a rule, was done on small plots in 
China, in contrast to what happened in, for example, the South of the 
United States. The same applies to the growing of tobacco and sugar. 
Processing all these crops normally was not done in big ‘manufactories’ 
either. The differences between what happened in China and, in these cases, 
in Britain’s colonies again are striking.  
The characteristics of Britain’s mode of production in agriculture – 
its preference for large scale farming, the use of animals and implements, 
and the ‘proletarianisation’ of much of its labour force - could facilitate and 
ease a process of industrialisation. Please note, I am not saying cause. But still, 
we see a certain trajectory here. There existed a persistent tendency in 
British agriculture - and more in general in Britain’s economy - to opt for 
large-scale solutions and to use wage labour. Employing wage labour is 
bound to lead to persistent efforts to increase efficiency and save labour as 
you actually have to pay a ‘stranger’ for what he or she is doing. Such 





Looking at the secondary sector of their economies, we again see that in 
China, in contrast to Britain, a household-mode of production 
predominated. Actually, in China, agriculture and ‘manufacturing’ were very 
often, more often than in Britain, combined under one roof. In Britain’s 
manufacturing too, overall, more production took place outdoors and/or 
employing non-family wage labour. If I would have to bet which mode of 
production was more likely to experiment with mechanisation and more in 
general ‘industrialization’, I would definitely choose the one that prevailed 
in Britain. Not because I already know that Britain would become the first 
industrial nation, but because that simply and for various reasons is the 
rational choice.  
If the primary as well as the secondary sector of an economy both 
are characterised by a household-mode of production, that must have major 





big machines or any other implements: those are far too expensive. 
Investment in capital goods overall will be negligent. As such households 
produce some manufactured goods themselves they will have a tendency to 
buy less of them on the market. They, moreover, have a tendency to not let 
go their labour force and even absorb extra labour instead of shedding it. 
The reasons for doing so are fairly obvious. That labour is family, which of 
course is different as compared to employing strangers, and it as a rule is 
cheaper: its inputs and outputs are not calculated on the basis of market 
prices. The household-mode of production, moreover, tends to make 
labour cheap as compared to capital goods and resources. That means it 
creates much less of an urgency to save labour costs. 
In Britain, in contrast, labour was relatively expensive and energy, the 
resource that is most relevant here, relatively cheap. That means that already 
long before industrialization we can see a clear tendency in this country to 
opt for techniques and modes of producing that were labour-saving, and 
for non-human sources of energy. Around 1700 already half of Britain’s 
energy consumption consisted of coal. The use of coal during its industrial 
revolution clearly as such is not a discontinuity in its economic history. The 
same goes for the use of machinery. Overall, more ‘machinery’ was used in 
production in Britain than in China already before industrialization and 
more technology was applied and developed to be used in production. 
In China, moreover, the system that in European economic history 
has become known as ‘putting-out’ or ‘Verlag’ was much less common than 
it was in Western Europe. What was more common there, in contrast, is 
what in German is called a Kaufsystem. In essence that means that someone 
buys something, does some processing, takes his product to a market and 
sells it to someone else. The person who buys the product, also does some 
processing, takes it to a market and sells it to someone else. In that way 
production often was characterised by extended lines of people each 
carrying out a specific part of the entire production process, whereas in 
Britain it was more common that in production to find some centrally 
coordinating ‘managers’, as a rule merchants. In practice, it was quite 
complicated to really get a grip on people working - at home - in such a 
putting-out system. However, it was different from a household mode of 
production in the sense that it was centrally coordinated, used some 
economies of scale, and was more capital-intensive in terms of the sums of 
money involved.  
 





Town and countryside: a division of labour?  
 
The tendency of household-producers to spend less money on markets, 
especially abstract and far-away markets, than wage-earners, will have had 
an impact on the level of urbanisation and the role of cities in China. In 
Europe, especially England, the level of urbanisation was much higher than 
it was in China, and it increased. In China, it probably was higher under the 
Sung Dynasty from the tenth to the thirteenth century, than it was under 
the Qing at the beginning of the nineteenth century.  
Concerning the level of urbanisation I think Pomeranz is right when, 
in his lecture, he indicated that as such urbanization need not mean much in 
terms of the size or concentration of markets. Population density in many 
rural areas in China was as high or even higher as in many urbanized 
regions in Europe. But population density is not all that matters: It might 
not even be what matters most in this context. In Europe, which I think is 
very important there usually was a division of labour between city and 
countryside, which you do not have to that extent between villages.  
 
 
Different trajectories already before Britain’s industrialization 
 
Industrialization in the nineteenth century tends to be associated with the 
massive use of fossil fuel as source of energy, with factories and wage 
labourers, with machinery, large-scale enterprises and urbanization. The 
Industrial Revolution indeed was a revolution. No doubt about that. 
Various major innovations, first and foremost the steam engine and the 
various ways in which it was put to use, fundamentally changed the 
productive capacity of Britain’s economy. But in many respects it was an 
accelerated continuation of a trajectory that was already characteristic for 
Britain’s economy for many decades if not centuries. 
Apart from the fact that, indeed, both Britain and China in the 
beginning of the eighteenth century still had Malthusian economies, I would 
claim their economies were not surprisingly similar but quite different. The 
probability that industrialization would originate in Britain was far higher 
than the probability that this would be the case in China. I am not at all 
suggesting that for a country on the British trajectory industrialization was 





people would later on describe as ‘industrialization’. In my view the chance 
that China would have become the first industrializing nation of the world, 
was about zero. It is highly improbable that an economy in which the costs 
of energy and resources as compared to human labour tend to rise and that 
has hardly any wage labour, will quite suddenly start to opt for a strategy in 
which cheap family labour has to be replaced by expensive, non-family 
wage labour using expensive machinery and energy sources. I would even 
go further. If China in the eighteenth century would have stumbled on an 
enormous stock of easily accessible coal and had acquired huge colonies, 
that, to my view, still would not have triggered a process of industrialization 
comparable to that in Britain.  
 
 
The service sector  
 
In most debates about the Industrial Revolution in Britain, people tend to 
forget that the emergence of modern economic growth in Britain and its 
economic primacy in the nineteenth century, involved much more than just 
the development of a modern industry. The period that Britain was an or 
rather the industrial nation of the world was only an interlude in its history, 
lasting only from roughly the 1820s till the 1870s. In many publications one 
tends to focus so much on steam and factories that one looses sight of the 
fundamental importance of the service sector for Britain’s economy at the 
time. The contribution of trade, transportation, finance and insurance to 
mention the most important sub-sectors, to Britain’s income and not to 
forget to its growth, was very substantial already before industrialization 
and it increased over time. I would dare to make an even bolder claim: I 
think that Britain could not have industrialized at all the way it did without 
its service sector.  
In comparisons of pre-industrial Britain and pre-industrial China by 
Pomeranz and other Californians we also see this relative neglect of the 
service sector. The focus tends to be on commodities and their production. 
That is not without risk and it in any case is curious, considering the 
enormous amounts of money circulating in that sector. A nice example of 
the ‘risks’ involved in such a focus would be the tea trade between Britain 
and China. The Chinese produced the tea. The British bought it and 
brought it to Europe. This is often presented as an exchange in which the 
Chinese somehow won and the British somehow lost. That is a 




misunderstanding. It is like thinking that Columbian coffee planters are the 
ones who really profit from coffee trade. That is not the case: the bulk of 
the money goes to Starbucks. Tea was sold in Britain in the beginning of 
the nineteenth century for prices many times as high as the prices that were 
paid to Chinese producers in China. The difference was pocketed entirely 
by Britons. In mercantile capitalism, but not only there, it as a rule is the 
intermediaries who earn and profit most not the producers. One cannot 
study the Great Divergence adequately without systematically looking at the 
service sector of the countries one is comparing and if one does so I think 
one will have to conclude that in this respect too Britain and China were 
quite different. Many of these differences are due to the specific political 
economies of both countries. That brings us to the role of the state. 
 
 
Bring in the state 
 
Let me now, after having discussed various topics related to modes of 
production, bring in a second set of topics that in the debate on the Great 
Divergence as yet have not been sufficiently explored but that would again 
cast serious doubts on the surprising-resemblances-thesis. They can be 
heaped together under the common denominator ‘the role of the state’. As 
such this need not and actually is not, unrelated to Pomeranz’s ‘coal and 
colonies’-explanation. When it comes to China’s supply of coal, the role of 
government is quite important, and fairly negative. Government often 
opposed opening new mines or closed existing ones as it was afraid that 
unruly miners would cause social unrest. When it comes to acquiring 
colonies, a similar comment can be made. If a tiny country like Britain can 
have them, why would that be impossible for China? Here too, government 
played an important and negative role. It did nothing to create an empire 
comparable to the overseas empires built by several European states. It was 
not interested. What is even more striking from a European perspective is 
that it did hardly anything with the enormous ghost acreage and resources 
of a region that actually was quite close to its heartland, i.e. Manchuria or of 
Xinjiang. The regions that were added to China Proper by the Qing rulers - 
who themselves came from Manchuria - by and large cost the Chinese state 
money.  
Things were quite different in (Western) Europe. That does not 





easy for such a relatively small country like Britain to acquire such a huge 
empire. To say that Britain was ‘lucky’ or ‘fortunate’ to have colonies or 
‘happened’ to have them, as Pomeranz likes to do, means one ignores the 
absolutely staggering amount of effort and resources it took Britain to 
acquire and keep its empire. It moreover trivialises the inseparable 
connections that existed between Britain and its empire, not only in strictly 
economic terms but also in terms of institutional development. The costs of 
empire were staggering. Britain had to fight numerous wars with the non-
European people who ended up in its empire or, like the inhabitants of the 
United States, escaped from it, and with its European fellow-colonizers like 
Spain, the Dutch Republic and France. Empire-building implied exporting 
European conflicts to the entire globe and turning that globe into a stage 
for Western warfare.  
Whereas costs of empire are not mentioned at all or just in passing 
by Pomeranz, its benefits in terms of providing cheap, land-intensive 
resources are exaggerated. This brings us to another fundamental and more 
general point in my critique of the work of the California School. I will 
discuss it here, although it does not perfectly fit in into the overall line of 
my argument of today. Most of the members of the California School, Jack 




Pre-occupation with resources 
 
Cheap and plentiful resources, coal and colonies, apparently did the trick, 
according to Pomeranz. In any case, they are supposed to have done so for 
Britain. But coal is a just fossil. It does not do anything on its own. You 
have to locate it, to get it out of the ground and do something with it. It is 
the same with colonies: they can provide ghost acreage on which land-
intensive raw materials can be produced that you can import. Let us take the 
example of cotton that was so crucial in Britain’s industrialization. What use 
would it have been to import so much of it, if Britain would not have been 
able to turn it into a finished product for which there was great demand? In 
brief, what exactly would have been the advantage of being able to import 
cotton in absence of a very efficient cotton industry? Aren’t Californians 
taking the egg for the chicken here? Moreover, if having or rather importing 
huge amounts of cheap cotton was so essential to Britain’s ability to 




industrialize, then why did not parts of China industrialize earlier? That 
country had enormous amounts of cheap cotton at home and on top of that 
it could import staggering amounts of raw cotton cheaply from India. 
Pomeranz seems to love ‘Toynbee-an’ challenge and response-arguments, 
in which the disadvantage of having mines that are constantly in danger of 
being flooded provides the positive challenge to invent a steam engine and 
the absence of raw cotton at home looks like a good reason to set up a 
cotton industry.  
Actually, to simply ‘have’ things or to acquire them is the kind of 
windfall that normally does not get one very far in history, and never for 
long. What you need, is an efficient system of production, i.e. high 
productivity. If you want to continue to be productive, in the sense of 
competitive, and get even richer, you need to be permanently innovative. 
To claim a country is rich because it happens to have coal or because it 
happens to have colonies is evading the really important question. It is 
taking what need not even be a necessary condition – Where are the coal 
and colonies of the Swiss or the Scandinavians, or for that matter of Meiji 
Japan? – for a sufficient one. The key to sustaining growth is innovation. 
The role of technology in the broadest sense of the word, including what 
one might call ‘social engineering’ or ‘management’, in processes of 
innovating is so obvious that I am not going to elaborate on it. The 
Californians, again with the clear exception of Goldstone, really should say 
more about science and technology. I would rather like to end by making 
some more comments on the role of institutions, in particular the state in 
the debate on the Great Divergence.  
 
 
Entirely different polities  
 
Whereas economists are focusing more and more on institutions, global 
economic history as practiced by the California School surprisingly enough 
tends to not pay a lot of attention to them. I will only focus here on the 
state, the ‘institution behind all institutions’. When looking at Britain and 
China at the eve of Britain’s industrialization, in this respect too, we see 
amazing differences that simply must have had major consequences for the 
economic development of both countries.  
In my view, China’s predicament in the nineteenth century, 





reference to the relative (as compared to Western powers) and absolute 
(considering the domestic problems it faced) failure of its state. That state 
simply lacked the means - and often also the motivation - to cope with the 
(new) challenges it had to face. It turned out to be very weak when it came 
to defending its interests against Western powers. It lacked money, 
personnel and a coherent strategy to deal with them and with the internal 
problems that increasingly plagued the country. It was too weak to uphold 
the status quo, let alone that it would be able to support upcoming 
industries and provide them with necessary infrastructure. 
Britain and China at the time were quite different states. Let me here 
just refer to some of the most striking differences. Talking about early 
modern states, means talking about the sinews of power i.e. money and 
therefore taxes. The tax level in Britain per capita, in real terms, was about five 
times as high as it was in China at the time of their diverging, around 1800. 
We are not talking about irrelevant sums here. In Britain, over the period 
from 1750 to 1850, tax revenue of central government on average will have 
amounted to some fifteen percent of national income. During the long 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, that percentage may have been as high 
as twenty percent and more. We lack hard data that would enable us to give 
figures for China but my guess would be that the average percentage here 
would be closer to five percent. I really have to emphasize that I am talking 
in terms of orders of magnitude here, in estimates if not guesstimates. But 
again, I would say, what we see is quite a difference. Pomeranz never refers 
to this. The word ‘tax’ does not figure in the index of his book. 
Government expenditure, again per capita, in real terms, at that time was no less 
than seven times as high in Britain as it was in China.  
If expenditure was so much higher than income, there must have 
been a massive debt. There indeed was. Just after the Napoleonic Wars, 
Britain had a national debt that amounted to some 260% of its GDP. 
Between 1760 and 1860, that debt never amounted to less than hundred per 
cent of GDP. China’s central government only began to experiment with 
borrowing money after the first Opium War. One can of course disagree 
about advantages and disadvantages of the systems of public finance, 
including their monetary systems, of Britain and China at the time. To me, 
to give just one example, however, it is quite obvious that Britain profited 
greatly from the fact that its government was able to borrow such 
enormous amounts of money from its subjects (and others) in case of need. 
China’s government simply was unable to do that, which meant that the 




relatively small debts that the country incurred from the Opium Wars 
onwards, could lead to major problems. But what one in any case can not do, 
is simply ignore matters of public finance and therewith suggest they are 
irrelevant. In works by Californians you find only very few references to 
public finance, and not many to private finance. I do not need to explain to 
you during the current crisis, that the financial sector is extremely important.  
There are other significant differences. They all point to a basically 
weak Chinese state. What to think of the fact that Britain’s central 
government around 1800 employed about as many bureaucrats as China’s? 
Or of the fact that the Chinese army at the time, according to the highest 
estimates I know, will have only been about one million people? Of whom 
the majority, by far, never did any fighting. For Britain during the 
Napoleonic Wars, one can find these figures in the literature: 260,000 
people serving in the army, 160,000 in the Royal Navy, and some 200,000 
soldiers fighting for the East India Company. I have not even mentioned 
then the 500,000 allied troops that Britain’s government was paying for at 
the moment are not even included here. The same goes for the 500,000 
volunteers serving in various Home Guards. Britain, including Ireland at the 
time had eighteen million inhabitants. If the Chinese would have had the 
same percentage of their population under arms, they would have had an 
army of over eighteen million people. In case of a head-to-head 
confrontation the Chinese army would have been no match for that of 
Britain. A Chinese fleet to confront the Royal Navy was well-neigh absent.  
 
 
Entirely different policies 
 
Britain and China were not only quite different when it comes to the 
structure and organization of their polities: their governments also had very 
different policies. The early modern era in Europe was an era of 
mercantilism: that is economic nationalism. The British state was and 
basically continued to be fiercely mercantilist until the 1840s, and it did 
everything it deemed necessary to strengthen its economy by supporting its 
producers and traders as compared to those of its competitors. China’s 
government was hardly interested in foreign trade. It at times even curbed it 
and in several respects clearly hampered it. It did not consider itself to be in 
competition with all its tiny and, from its perspective, fairly uninteresting 





extremely competitive and violent setting of early modern Europe a state 
could not afford such a laid-back, hands-off approach.  
Europe was a system of states that were fairly equal in size and 
potential and that constantly waged economic or real wars. This created a 
kind of state and a kind of economic policy that were fundamentally 
different from those we find in China. Here too, the differences must have 
made a difference. Just think of the Navigation Acts, and the way in which 
they were used to give Britain a competitive advantage to the rest of the 
world, or the way in which the British state supported the development of a 
domestic industry producing cotton textiles. Nothing similar to this can be 
found in China. Operating in a different environment and facing different 
problems, China’s rulers behaved quite differently. They did not opt for a 
mercantilist policy. That need not imply they were backward, conservative, 
or too passive, although in some respects I think they were. Why would 
they want to solve problems they did not have? Until a couple of decades 
into the nineteenth century China did not face any serious economic 






In trying to explain the Great Divergence one clearly must look at resources, 
first and foremost at energy. In that respect the California School, to a large 
extent basing itself on work by Tony Wrigley, has a major point. If a 
country does not solve the basic problems Malthus described, especially in 
the field of energy, it simply will continue to be stuck at a low level of 
economic development and wealth. The West, according to Pomeranz cum 
suis, escaped from Malthus via coal, or rather the steam engine using coal, 
and by importing land-intensive products from some of its peripheries. 
Coal and colonies definitely were fundamental in the Rise of the West. But 
reference to them cannot suffice to explain it. There is more to explaining 
that very complex phenomenon. Moreover, the fact that it was (parts of) 
the West that profited from coal and colonies as such cannot be left un-
explained as a kind of simple good luck. It has deep, firm and extended 
roots in Western history.  
Overall, Californians would be well-advised to broaden their 
approach, as some, e.g. Jack Goldstone, have already done. In this text, I 




only discussed matters regarding the modes of production and the nature of 
the state of the two countries that are central to the debates on the Great 
Divergence, Britain and China. I might also have referred to the role of 
culture and that of science and technology which also are relatively 
neglected in the work of most Californians.  
In my work, at the moment, I focus on the state. I think you cannot 
understand the functioning of an economy if you ignore it. The tendency to 
do so, by the way, might be one of the less fortunate effects of the current 
focus on ‘the global’ in historiography. For many topics a transnational or 
for that matter a regional approach indeed is preferable over the traditional 
national one. But in discussing the Great Divergence one simply has to take 
on board the many ways in which the state impinged on the economy of 
the countries one compares.  
Doing so would clearly not solve all our problems, if problems are 
ever really solved in such a complex debate as this. I have pointed at 
fundamental differences between Britain and China when it comes to their 
modes of production and when it comes to the nature of their states. 
Especially in the latter case the exact effects of the differences I referred to 
and the ways in which they can be connected to the Great Divergence are 
not at all obvious. I have pointed at the fact that taxation was much higher 
in Britain than it was in China. The same goes for government expenditures 
and national debt. But what does this mean? Does it mean that a high level 
of taxation, government expenditure – most of it on war! - and public debt 
is conducive to economic development? Many if not most economists 
would not immediately agree, to put it mildly. My answer at the moment is 
that in the case of early modern and industrializing Britain, it to a certain 
extent definitely was. I also indicated that Britain was a mercantilist state 
when it took off. Does that mean that Adam Smith and most economists 
are wrong and that mercantilism in the end was a Good Thing? My answer 
would again be: Yes to a certain extent it was. The answers to these 
questions are anything but undisputed and indisputable. Debates about the 
role of the state in economic development have never completely calmed 
down and at the moment they are clearly flaring up again. But whatever 
their outcome, the differences I pointed at between China and Britain, in 
the nature of their states as well as in their modes of production, must have 
made a difference. We really must take them on board if we want to get 
closer to solving the riddle of the Great Divergence.  
